On 26 June the NSW Government announced Trent Curtin as the new Commissioner of the Rural Fire Service, following the retirement of Rob Rogers from this vital emergency leadership role, after 40 years of service to the RFS.
“Mr Curtin commenced his career 30 years ago as a volunteer firefighter with the Country Fire Authority in Victoria and has served in senior leadership roles in the emergency services in both Victoria and NSW. These roles included Acting Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioner at Fire and Rescue NSW with responsibility for Community Fire Unit volunteers. He also served as Assistant Chief Fire Officer at Fire Rescue Victoria between 2015 and 2020. Mr Curtin has extensive experience battling major fires, floods and coordinating large-scale responses involving multiple agencies to significant emergency incidents.”
Mr Curtin comes with a science degree and a Masters of Business Administration, and will commence duty on 14 July.
IBG comment
IBG wishes Mr Rogers well in retirement and congratulates Mr Curtin on his appointment. We look forward to how fresh leadership might enhance bushfire management in NSW.
The appointment of an ‘outsider’ to lead the RFS is a break from tradition. Since the creation of the RFS in 1997 under inaugural Commissioner Phil Koperberg, the two subsequent commissioners have come from deputy roles in the organisation.
Since its inception, IBG has advocated for improvements to how bushfires are managed, to reduce impacts on firefighters, communities and the environment. In a long list, concerns include a stronger focus on initial attack (especially for remote fires), evidence-based strategies for large fires, commitment to a strong learning culture supported with post-fire analysis, recruiting and retaining volunteers and professional fire experts, transparency, better inter-agency cooperation, a supportive culture and building community resilience.
The RFS deserves excellent and progressive leadership. It is hoped that the next period can be one of renewal and reform while all the best aspects of the organisation and its vital functions are retained and strengthened.
In late December 2024 to early January 2025, NSW firefighting authorities faced a run of numerous bushfires in remote locations. Most if not all were ignited by lightning. On 27 December storms swept over the Blue Mountains and about a dozen fires popped up across the northern parts of Wollemi and Yengo national parks and adjacent bushland.
Other fires occurred in remote parts of Blue Mountains, Kosciuszko and Oxley Wild Rivers national parks. With no access for ground vehicles, all these fires had to be managed with aerial attack and remote area firefighter teams (RAFT) taken to the fireground by helicopter. Fortuitously, although the weather was sometimes hot, overall firefighting conditions were moderate.
The Yengo-Wollemi Complex of fires on the morning of 29 December 2024 (Source: FiresNearMe)
More storms on 5 January brought more ignitions. At one stage there were more than 30 fires burning in the northern Blue Mountains, in the ‘Yengo-Wollemi Complex’ and further south. So many fires fires in the region has not been exceeded since 1997. While details are hard to come by (see below), it seems that while many of these fires were initially under NPWS management, all the Yengo-Wollemi fires were eventually placed in RFS control under three section 44 declarations, in Singleton-Muswellbrook, Lithgow and Hawkesbury LGAs. This generated large multi-agency campaigns.
The situation on the evening of 6 January 2025, after storms on 5 January ignited many more fires (Source: FiresNearMe)
At one stage, RFS Facebook posts said that 500 firefighters, IMT members and support teams were engaged in the effort, and on 6 January that 1.2 million litres of water per day was being transported onto the Singleton-Muswellbrook fires. Firefighters came from RFS, NPWS, Fire and Rescue and Forestry Corporation. This was perhaps the largest and most complex bushfire operation in NSW since Black Summer 2019-20. It received little to no mainstream media coverage, probably because no property was under imminent threat and high profile fires were running in Victoria at the time.
Most if not all of the fires were in areas burnt in Black Summer, raising concerns in some nearby communities that had been impacted. Some of the fires were quickly contained, while others spread and became ongoing challenges. Triage came into play, and resources were prioritised to fires according to the risks each one posed. Aerial attack (bombing with water, foam or retardant) can ‘knock down’ a fire, but only people on the ground or substantial rain can finish the job. The holiday period would have made mustering the large numbers of RAFT needed from NPWS and RFS more difficult.
Good news from the largest fire, at Dingo Creek in Wollemi National Park (Source: FiresNearMe)
The largest fires grew to 1908 hectares (Dingo Creek, Wollemi NP) and 1796 hectares (Yarrowitch Trail, Oxley Wild Rivers NP) before being contained. In an impressive effort, nearly all fires were contained before rain stopped most play on 7 January. Continued rain saw all fires extinguished.
The situation on 16 January 2025: all fires contained after extensive rainfall (Source: FiresNearMe)
IBG comment
As probably the largest NSW fire operation since Black Summer, the Yengo-Wollemi Complex is a great opportunity to review how bushfire operations have improved or changed, especially for remote fires. The diversity of fires and possibly also differences in how they were managed would allow useful comparison of the most effective responses, strategies and tactics.
Given the paucity of past fire analysis by either RFS or NPWS, IBG is not confident that it will happen in this case. After Action Reviews, debriefs and lessons processes may now be in place across all agencies, but a proper understanding of time-and-event and the effectiveness of operations must be based on more than what people say. Hard evidence is essential, in the form of detailed record-keeping followed by objective analysis.
This run of fires in moderate conditions would have given numerous firefighters, leaders and support people a lot of valuable experience that should be built on with good analysis and review.
Since Black summer, IBG has strongly advocated for faster and stronger initial attack, especially on remote fires that can get out of hand quickly and create huge suppression problems. Bushfire authorities have expressed and adopted this mantra, and there has been an expansion of aerial resources and also RAFT numbers in RFS and NPWS. Multiple ignitions are a challenge to whatever preparations are in place, and it is as yet unclear how well the theory has translated into practice across these fires. Even if adequate resources are available, they need to be backed up with the right protocols and speed and weight of response.
Post from Tumut s44 on 30 December 2024 (source: RFS Facebook)
Multi-agency community engagement at Glen Alice in the Capertee Valley, near the Dingo Creek Fire (Source: RFS Facebook)
Official media coming out of RFS head office emphasised the role of RFS resources, especially aircraft and volunteers, however much of the RAFT work was done by NPWS staff firefighters. This corporate emphasis is understandable, but in section 44 fires RFS is in complete control of multi-agency operations and also public information which requires a more objective approach. However local RFS section 44 commands, such as in Lithgow (Chifley) and Tumut (Riverina Highlands), often highlighted the role of NPWS, Fire and Rescue, Forestry and other players in their own media. Giving due recognition to all participant is important in maintaining the morale and effectiveness of the entire bushfire industry.
Post from Lithgow s44 on 30 December 2024 (source: RFS Facebook)
understand and build the existing use profile of the aerial firefighting (water-bombing) platforms, across different states, territories and landscapes in Australia.
understand the profile of the purposes for which aerial firefighting platforms are deployed, and how effective that purpose has been.
The Australia-wide project will use more than 10 years of data from the ARENA database as well as case studies of specific aerial fire-fighting operations. The NSW RFS is assisting the research.
Loading the water bucket, Blue Mountains 2013
IBG comment
Aerial firefighting is an increasingly important part of bushfire suppression. It is also one of the main costs for large fires, so effectiveness and efficiency are vital issues.
The questions this research is asking are very good ones, and it is hoped the project will produce better guidance for bushfire operations. Given how difficult it is for independent citizen groups to obtain information about aircraft use, it also hoped that this project will provide some answers.
It is surprising that these questions are only now being asked, especially the first question about how aircraft are being used. IBG has long questioned whether the makeup of the NSW aerial firefighting fleet is optimal and being used to best effect during fires. Many active firefighters have similar concerns, with a lot of cynicism about how large air tankers (LATs) are deployed.
Specific issues of concern are the best mix of aircraft, particularly LATs versus smaller fixed-wing bombers, and the best options for initial attack on multiple fires. It seems the firefighting agencies do not have evidence-based answers to these issues, so this overdue research is very welcome.
Recommendation 50(b) from the 2020 NSW Bushfire Inquiry report called for Government to “work with states and territories through the National Aerial Firefighting Centre to review the current mix of aviation assets and determine whether it is fit-for-purpose, noting the current lack of mid-sized fire fighting aircraft“.
Recommendation 50(b) has been listed as “Complete” since June 2021, citing the development of the National Aerial Firefighting Strategy 2021-26. But the strategy does not include any ‘review’ of either the NSW fleet or the national fleet. In fact, the strategy repeatedly stresses that each jurisdiction needs to do its own review.
NSW RFS Large Air Tanker ‘Marie Bashir’ dropping fire retardant (Source: RFS Facebook)
The outcomes of Why Fly? will depend on the extent and quality of the available data. Data on aerial missions should include clear and measurable objectives with an assessment of effectiveness and the factors involved. For NSW at least, good aerial data such as this may be lacking.
As reported in a previous IBG post (April 5, 2023), a NSW pilot study into the Black Summer fires from NHRA (Investigating the suitability of aviation tracking data for use in bushfire suppression effectiveness research, January 2023) found that a lot of basic data was missing which “hamper learning and needs to be improved”. It is unclear whether data collection has improved since 2020, or whether the ‘evaluation database’ recommended by the study has been established.
“Fire management agencies should create an evaluation database that summarises objectives, outcomes, the number and type of aircraft, drops, type and litres, and ancillary observations such as weather, resources available etc.”
This inquiry by the Public Accounts Committee of the Legislative Assembly kicked off in February 2024 with public submissions followed by two hearing days in August and September. Full details, terms of reference, submissions and hearing transcripts are available on the inquiry’s web page.
The inquiry wanted to hear from “…people with first-hand experience, emergency service organisations and their volunteer associations and unions, local councils, bushfire experts, community groups and the public” (Media release, Public Accounts Committee, 20 February 2014).
The inquiry received 78 submissions and heard witnesses from about 26 organisations, mainly local councils but also government agencies, RFS brigades and the IBG. The three main firefighter representative groups made submissions: Rural Fire Service Association (official representative body for RFS volunteers), Volunteer Fire Fighters Association (alternative and independent body for RFS volunteers) and Fire Brigade Employees Union (union representing NSW Fire and Rescue employees).
The inquiry seems to have been prompted mainly by the complicated management arrangements for the ‘red fleet’ (RFS firefighting vehicles) and local bushfire premises (eg. local brigade fire sheds), as highlighted by the local government sector and NSW Audit Office (see their 2023 report: “Planning and managing bushfire equipment” and IBG post of March 20, 2023). The inquiry is also interested in the roles of RFS and local government in bushire management and district bushfire management committees.
Many of these issues go back to legislation which created the Rural Fire Service in 1997, and also reduced the previous major role of local government in bushfire brigades and bushfire management. Many submissions to the inquiry regard the existing arrangements for assets and premises as no longer fit for purpose and in need of reform. Local government in particular is concerned about the administrative and cost burden on their sector, when they have little or no control of assets on their books.
A repeated concern in submissions was the need to reform the Rural Fires Act 1997, which includes artefacts from previous legislation and provisions about assets that are no longer practical. Some submissions called for the oft-cited number of 70,000+ RFS members to be audited, and queried the efficacy of funding the RFS via the NSW emergency services levy on ratepayers.
Given the almost universal concern that ‘red fleet’ management is unnecessarily complex and inconsistent, it seems likely that the inquiry will recommend rationalisation of the ownership and management of these vehicles.
The inquiry will also report on other issues from the terms of reference.
IBG comment
While some of these ‘administrative’ issues may seem peripheral, they do impact the effectiveness of the state’s bushfire management capability. Efficiency is important.
The many issues around assets, premises and funding need to be considered within the bigger picture: that is, what is required to achieve clear objectives – putting fires out and protecting people, property and the environment. There is a vital need for more operational analysis, a strong learning culture and financial accountability, coupled with independent oversight.
NSW lacks an over-arching bushfire strategy. There is no statewide risk analysis to inform prevention and suppression.
In its submission, IBG urged a full review of RFS functions and the roles of RFS and local government, pointing out that beyond equipment management, local government could be more involved in other aspects of bushfire and especially in building disaster resilience in communities.
IBG noted the disparity in the standard of bushfire sheds and suggested a statewide audit followed by an upgrade program.
IBG documented the lack of a strategic approach to aerial assets (aircraft) and the need for better data and analysis.
IBG called for an audit of RFS volunteer numbers and stressed the need for a recruitment strategy and greater diversity.
IBG recommended that NSW needs a stronger learning culture in emergency operations, with an Inspector General of Emergency Management to lead this and provide assurance and accountability to the emergency sector.
On financial accountability, IBG pointed out the paucity of research on bushfire suppression to assist the best decision-making, and urged more analysis of large bushfire operations coupled with evaluation of the effectiveness of past expenditure.
Submissions can’t be published on this website due to parliamentary inquiry rules. All submissions can be seen on the inquiry’s web page.
The recently established NSW Bushfire & Natural Hazards Research Centre (see post below of 24 July) has published their research program. Most of the 19 projects are bushfire-related, covering topics as diverse as smoke hazards, fuel management, early detection of lightning fires, backburning, ecological management, fire retardant impacts and utilising FESM (fire extent severity mapping). Many of the projects are classified as “large > $200,000” with timeframes running up to 2+ years.
The BNHRC is an extraordinarypartnership between eight NSW Government end-user agencies…and six participating universities (WSU, UNSW, UOW, ANU, UMelb, and UTAS).
– BNHRC website
This program is a major step up in research to support and improve evidence-based fire management, and one of the more progressive outcomes from the NSW Independent Bushfire Inquiry. Interested people can sign up online for the centre’s newsletter.
IBG comment
This extensive research program is very welcome, especially in the previously depauperate landscape of research to help bushfire operations. For some projects, the 2019-2020 season will provide a wealth of data and examples. All research outputs should be published.
It is hoped the outputs will also be useful and robust enough to encourage the government to extend the life of the BNHRC beyond the few years currently funded. The potential economic payoff in bushfire management costs and impacts from this investment is considerable, noting that a $200,000 project is equivalent to the cost of about three drops from the NSW Marie Bashir VLAT (very large air tanker).
A number of projects are particularly relevant to issues on which IBG has been advocating. These include backburning and the ecological impacts of fire. These projects arise from specific recommendations of the NSW Bushfire Inquiry which handed down its report in 2020. After a long wait of four years its encouraging to see those recommendations activated.
The backburning and fire-break project will need to delve deeply into the operational details of examples to determine the fundamental reasons for successful and unsuccessful burns, in order to produce guidance for future operations. These details include not only fire and weather conditions, but also the resources used and how and when actions were undertaken.
As an outcome of the NSW Independent Bushfire Inquiry, each year the NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) releases a Fire Season Outlook for the coming bushfire season. The Outlook for 2024-25 was recently tabled in NSW Parliament. It contains a lot of helpful information and deserves wide exposure, especially within at-risk communities.
The inquiry’s 2nd recommendation said that the public statement from the Government: “…should form the basis for clear public communication about these risks on a regional basis and the actions that Government proposes in preparation.”
This year’s report includes a forecast of weather and fuel conditions for the upcoming season and a summary of preparation that has been undertaken, including hazard reduction works. The Predicted Fire Season Outlook (page 5) maps all of NSW at ‘normal’ fire potential, while pointing out that forest areas burnt in 2019-2020 may carry fire again. This is partly because of the regrowth that has occurred during the past few wet years.
The report also identifies that grassland areas of NSW could dry out enough to pose an above normal risk.
The resource capabilities of the four firefighting agencies are listed on page 13, showing a total of 1,510 remote area firefighters across RFS and National Parks and Wildlife Service, 510 Community Fire Units supported by Fire and Rescue NSW, and over 5,500 firefighting appliances (tankers, pumpers, etc) across all four agencies.
In broad terms, the key risks for the 2024-25 bush fire season include:
– Grassland areas west of the Great Dividing Range may pose an above normal risk, particularly later in the fire season.
– Once dry, forest areas could carry fast and intense fires under elevated fire danger conditions. This includes areas that were burnt during the 2019-20 Black Summer fires, many of which have now recovered.
Fire Season Outlook 2024-2025 (NSW Rural Fire Service, n.d.)
On Saturday 21 September a planned burn for hazard reduction near Oxford Falls on Sydney’s northern beaches escaped containment and spread rapidly south-east to a much larger area.
At times the fire behaviour and flame heights were severe. This was two days after the first total fire ban for the season in the Sydney area. During the afternoon the threat to life and property was deemed imminent and an emergency ‘too late to leave’ alert was issued to local residents. The response to the emergency involved hundreds of firefighters and a number of aircraft.
The ‘Meatworks’ hazard reduction was reportedly planned to be 24 hectares in size. The larger fire was succesfully contained on 23 September at 147 hectares (Source: Fires Near Me).
Early stages of the breakout of the Oxford Falls planned fire, 21 September 2024 (Source: Fires Near Me)
The breakout fire was prominent from many parts of Sydney, and provoked much commentary. Not all of it was well-informed, but many volunteer firefighters expressed dismay and anger on the Rural Fire Service facebook page.
On 24 September, the Commissioner of the Rural Fire Service issued a memo to the RFS saying “We will be conducting a local After Action Review along with a formal internal inquiry to assess if any improvements can be made to avoid such occurrences in the future“.
Continuous improvement is key to ensuring our firefighting efforts remain effective and safe for both our members and the community.
– RFS Commissioner Rob Rogers, RFS memo 24 September 2024
Later stage of the Oxford Falls breakout, 21 September 2024 (Source: Fires Near Me)
Media coverage
Mainstream media reported on the crisis as it unfolded and, to a lesser extent, on the context and aftermath:
ABC News, 21 September 2024: ‘Bushfire burning in Sydney’s Northern Beaches downgraded from Emergency warning to Advice’
An IBGopinion article related to this event was published in the Sydney Morning Herald online on 25 September and in the print edition on 27 September:
The Sydney Morning Herald article includes some IBG comment, but there is more to say. IBG has written about many of those issues before, much of it on this website. Planned burns are a complex management task, with many risk factors and opportunities to go wrong. All risk factors need to be considered for each burn, but not all risks can be controlled.
Planned burns (both prescribed burns for hazard reduction and backburns for controlling wildfires) have escaped in the past and more will escape in the future. IBG members have themselves lost burns in their firefighting careers. In 2020 a burn by Fire and Rescue NSW and the National Parks and Wildlife Service escaped prominently at North Head in Sydney. The important response is not to assign blame but to analyse why these events happen and identify and act upon the lessons learned.
Past experience and analysis has shown that firefighting agencies have insufficient commitment and capacity to properly examine and learn from negative outcomes. And the same applies to good outcomes, where it is just as important to learn how these were achieved. Identifying lessons is not enough; lessons must be documented, promulgated to firefighters and built into practice. There is a vast literature with guidelines and policies on lessons management, but they are insufficiently applied.
Whilst an After Action Review (involving those involved) of the Meatworks incident is a welcome commitment, it should have been routine and has to be well managed, while the internal review is also welcome but inadequate. Any agency investigating itself has a conflicted and impossible task. This is not the best way to produce a report that will be seen by the community as thorough and objective.
Some may say that backburning (which requires much the same planning and skills as prescribed burning) has been well examined, and point to the 2020 NSW Bushfire Inquiry and the 2024 NSW Bushfires Coronials. But this is incorrect. The inquiry did not look at any backburns in detail. The coronials examined only a few, and left many questions about those few unanswered. Most backburns from the 2019-2020 bushfires remain unexamined, whether successful or unsuccessful.
Expert research on backburn and prescribed burn escapes has to date been minimal, and it is essential that more happens to provide better guidance to firefighters. A new project being run by the new NSW Bushfire and Natural Hazards Research Centre (see IBG post of July 24 below) should help to fill this gap, but it comes nearly five years after the 2019-2020 fires which provide such a strong evidence base. The project “Evaluating backburning and fire-break operations” will take two years and more than $200,000. Such evaluation needs to be ongoing.
Reviews, inquiries and research should be routine, expert and independent. These are some of the reasons the IBG has been pushing for an Inspector General of Emergency Management for NSW. This is the only way to ensure the right lessons are learned and acted upon for continuous improvement, while also reducing controversy and the ongoing cycle of one-off and inadequate reviews.
Review bodies for many other public safety industries have shown the way. Police, health, the military, even the intelligence services, have independent oversight bodies. They should be welcomed by agencies and government as a positive boon to continuous improvement, safety for all and transparency.
Burning for hazard reduction is another very complex issue (see IBG post of 21 July below: “Shortfall in planned burning”). Public and media understanding of the costs, benefits, challenges and technicalities is often poor. Fuel reduction can be useful, especially close to assets and to strengthen natural fire barriers. But, as several RFS Commissioners have said, burning is no panacea. Burning is a useful tool when used well, and partly a numbers game. That is, each effective burn will offer some assistance and protection to a limited area for a limited time, but only if a wildfire threatens within that period.
IBG does not support area-based ‘targets’ because the focus on strategic burning for specific benefits can be replaced with a focus on hectares burnt. ‘Properties protected’ targets are better, but still somewhat fraught. As pressure to burn increases, and as burns perhaps are pushed into more marginal opportunities, the community needs to understand that escapes may become more likely, with increased risk of impacts.
Educative and constructive public discussion is essential to optimise the use of limited burning resources (and weather windows to do burns) and also to maintain some kind of consensus within the community. IBG will continue to contribute to this discussion.
The NSW Bushfire and Natural Hazards Research Centre has been created as an outcome of the 2020 NSW Independent Bushfire Inquiry and the 2022 NSW Flood Inquiry. Commencing in February 2024, the centre is still in the establishment phase.
The BNHRC “unites researchers from partner universities with government agencies, frontline emergency services, Aboriginal people and community stakeholders in a collective effort to tackle the challenges posed by bushfires and other natural hazards” (BNHRC website).
The centre also says it will “focus on the research needed to address key recommendations from the 2020 Bushfire Inquiry and 2022 Flood Inquiry“. The government-funded consortium is led by Western Sydney University as a collaboration with a number of other universities.
IBG comment
This is a welcome advance on the limited disaster research landscape, especially given the threat of increased disasters with climate change and the critical need for adaptive strategies. A potentially powerful team of researchers has been assembled. However it is understood funding is limited to a few years. IBG would like to see this made permanent.
As yet there is no published research program, but IBG understands several projects have commenced. We look forward to further details being published.
IBG, researchers and others have repeatedly called attention to the small amount of research into bushfire operations in Australia, especially in terms of strategies and effectiveness (eg. see IBG’s Learning from past fire operations for future success).
IBG’s view is that it is essential to collect more information, conduct more analysis and learn much more from past fire operations. Areas needing attention include the effectiveness of aerial firefighting and the cost/benefit of better rapid response to remote lightning fires. It is to be hoped that the new research centre can help to rectify this shortfall with some urgency.
After wet weather in May the Rural Fire Service issued a media statement saying that “thousands of hectares of hazard reduction burns scheduled for autumn have been postponed“.
“…it is now unlikely that proposed hazard reduction burn targets for this financial year will be met”.
– RFS Commissioner Rob Rogers, media release 14 May 2024
The statement says that government agencies including the National Parks and Wildlife Service and Forestry Corporation, with other landholders, had made “significant progress towards targets” before wet weather impacted programs.
Minister for Emergency Services Jihad Dib said “hazard reduction burning plays a vital role in mitigating bush fire intensity and safeguarding lives and properties“.
Larger planned burns often involve helicopters for dropping incendiaries and monitoring fire behaviour.
IBG Comment
As the next fire season approaches, its helpful to consider the role of planned burning in mitigating wildfires. The goal of planned burning is not to produce areas that will not burn, but areas that will burn at a lower intensity which can assist control by firefighters.
Planned burns are always difficult to achieve due to the many challenges, which include weather, logistics and resourcing. Weather windows to burn with the desired intensity (prescription) are narrow and diminishing due to climate change. Burns near property can be intricate, tricky and need a lot of resources and precise planning. Some resources such as volunteer firefighters are less available during weekdays.
NSW currently operates planned burning according to targets, not readily available to the public, that are based on area treated. IBG is concerned that such targets are a poor way of measuring success in planned burning programs because the focus on the strategic value of burns may be diminished.
Planned burning does not eliminate the threat of fires. Successive RFS Commissioners have emphasised that it helps, but is not a panacea. Planned burning to strategically reduce fuels in the bush is just one important tool in a comprehensive bushfire mitigation program together with a range of other activities. “Hazard reduction” means modification of fuels by prescribed burning, or other means such as slashing and clearing (AFAC).
The effectiveness of planned burns in protecting life and property depends upon location, vegetation type, the intensity of the burn, time and weather since the burn was done and the prevailing conditions when a wildfire meets the previously burnt area. Statistically, only a proportion of burns will ever be useful because of the low likelihood of any particular burn being met by a wildfire within the burn’s useful life.
In the fires of 2019-2020, the usefulness of previous burns (including wildfires) varied a lot. In some cases they stopped or slowed the advancing fire, while in others they made little difference. Generally, burns that had been done within three years of the wildfire were most useful, while past burns were less effective in moderating fire behaviour in elevated bushfire weather. In other cases, previously burned areas were not used as effectively as they might have been to assist control strategies.
Some specific examples of how past burns worked in the 2019-2020 fires are included in the IBG fire studies. A more general study was undertaken for Natural Hazards Research Australia into how planned fires in the previous five years affected the Black Summer wildfires. It found that “the proportion of high severity fire was lower in areas that had previous prescribed burns (especially if conducted in the last one or two years)“.
This conclusion recognises that planned burns are not placed only to protect adjacent property. They are also used to create strategic advantages at the broader landscape level, especially by the large bushland managers being Forestry Corporation and National Parks and Wildlife Service.
IBG asserts that along with planned burning, more emphasis and effort is needed on asset protection zones, community education/resilience, community protection plans and individual property management.
They say that areas that have ‘escaped’ fire for ‘decades or centuries’ are important for biodiversity because they ‘tend to harbour vital structures for wildlife, such as tree hollows and large logs’.
We found areas of long unburnt vegetation (30 years or more without fire) are shrinking. Meanwhile, areas of recently burnt vegetation (5 years or less since the most recent fire) are growing. And fires are burning more frequently.
The Conversation, 23 April, 2024
By analysing 40 years of fires on 21.5 million hectares of conservation reserves and state forests across southern Australia, they found that fires ‘are becoming more frequent in many of the areas most crucial for protecting threatened wildlife’. Long unburnt habitat is disappearing, putting many fire-threatened species at risk.
Long unburnt coastal Melaleuca forest, Croajingolong National Park, eastern Victoria. Much of this park was burnt in the 2019-2020 bushfires.
This different group of four researchers looked at Indigenous and early colonial records of tall, wet forests in Victoria and analysed the scientific evidence. They conclude that ‘most areas of mainland mountain ash forests were likely to have been dense and wet at the time of British invasion’. Mountain Ash (Eucalyptus regnans), is the world’s tallest flowering plant and prominent in the tall, wet forests of Tasmania and Victoria.
“The ecological and other scientific evidence suggests mountain ash forests evolved under conditions where high-severity bushfires were rare…these forests were not open or park-like – as was the case in some other vegetation types in Australia”
The Conversation, 24 April 2024
The researchers point out that Aboriginal traditional knowledge recognises ‘Country that needs fire, and Country that doesn’t need fire’. They write that repeated fire is ‘unsuited to the ecology of tall, wet forests’, that it will ‘destroy habitat for a wide range of species’ and could lead to ‘collapse and replacement by entirely different vegetation such as wattle scrub’.
Tall, wet forest of Spotted Gum (Corymbia maculata), south coast NSW.
IBG comment
These research reports contribute to the ongoing discussion about the diverse role of fire in the Australian environment and how fire can be managed with biodiversity conservation in mind.
The research also highlights that fire regimes are complex at all scales and specific to particular places. Fire management needs to respond to these variations. Generalisations across broad landscapes are unhelpful.
Independent Bushfire Group 
.jpg){kind=link}